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20 November 1965

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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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
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\*Vietnam: (Information as of 4:30 AM EST)

The Military Situation in South Vietnam: Continued contact with Communist forces was reported yesterday for the sixth consecutive day in western Pleiku Province.

US forces participating in the battle west of Plei Me moved to new field positions during 18-19 November, and have been joined by three Vietnamese airborne battalions several miles northwest of the original battle line.


Cumulative Communist losses since 14 November now total 1,209 killed and 19 captured. In addition, US forces have captured or destroyed in place some 850 enemy weapons, including 93 crew-served. US casualties are 250 killed and 358 wounded.

Elsewhere during the past two days, Viet Cong forces of estimated battalion strength attacked a Vietnamese Regional Force company in central Phu Yen Province. Preliminary reports listed 28 government casualties; enemy losses during the action were unknown. In Gia Dinh Province, an estimated two companies of Viet Cong attacked a government outpost only five miles southwest of Saigon during the night of 18-19 November. Vietnamese marine defenders sustained 22 casualties while reportedly killing 16 Viet Cong. A few miles further south, enemy forces early yesterday directed intense mortar fire on the district headquarters at Binh Chanh.

After a seven-hour battle, government forces in Quang Tin Province have reportedly re-occupied the district headquarters at Hiep Duc, attacked and overrun by enemy forces on 17 November. On 18 November, Vietnamese troops conducting a sweep operation in Quang Nam Province killed an estimated 175 Communists (65 confirmed by body count), while sustaining casualties of three killed and 24 wounded.

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## NORTH VIETNAM: SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILE SITES



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The Political Situation in South Vietnam: For the first time, Saigon student union leaders have called for an end to the Ky government. At a press conference yesterday, the president of the student union spoke at length on the failures of the regime and emphasized its lack of popular support. He characterized the conference as the beginning of "the struggle between Ky and the students!"

Student representatives from Dalat also reportedly attacked the government at the conference. Student groups in the Hué area have been openly hostile to the government since August. The US Embassy has reported, however, that it doubts the influence of yesterday's spokesmen within Saigon student circles.

Meanwhile, a US Embassy survey of civilian reactions to US/Vietnamese military operations has indicated some signs of popular anxiety over the accelerating tempo of the war. Much of the anxiety is expressed by the more articulate political, religious, and intellectual groups; the majority of the population appears to be fatalistic, passive, or confused by rapidly changing developments. Embassy reporters, however, could find no evidence to support the assertion that the large numbers of rural refugees--many of whom are fleeing allied air and artillery strikes--were blaming the Viet Cong for their predicament.]

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Military Developments in North Vietnam: Drone photography [redacted] has disclosed an additional SAM site--number 46--located approximately 30 miles northwest of Hanoi. The site contains six occupied revetted launch positions, an occupied central guidance area, and a hold area. Six missiles were seen in various positions around the site.]

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Laotian Developments: The second significant south-bound movement of trucks on the northern section of


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Route 23 during the current dry season was noted by a roadwatch team on 18 November. The team reported 48 unidentified trucks moving south along the route. On 11 and 12 November the same team reported the southbound movement of 59 trucks, 42 of which carried unidentified Communist troops.

The recently reported bypass around the damaged sections of Mu Gia pass is now being used by trucks and significant numbers of Communist troops, [redacted]

30 unidentified trucks moving south over the bypass on 7 November. In addition, [redacted] one battalion of "enemy" troops walking over the bypass on 6 November and that 500 PAVN soldiers used the same route going south two days later. [redacted]

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UK-Rhodesia-Zambia: [British Prime Minister Wilson has privately cautioned Zambian President Kaunda about taking any rash unilateral action against Rhodesia.]

[Wilson's message, written in reply to recent letters from Kaunda, is intended to convince the Zambian leaders that they cannot expect the UK to bail them out if they bring disaster on themselves. Kaunda has been under pressure to consider a total boycott of Rhodesia, which could bring crippling economic retaliation from Salisbury. Wilson promised aid if Zambia suffered unprovoked injury, but played down the practicality of any airlift to help Zambia in the event of such retaliation.]

[Wilson's handling of the Rhodesian crisis has greatly enhanced his personal position both at home and abroad, according to the US Embassy in London. The embassy, nevertheless, points out that he faces a difficult problem in trying to maintain Britain's control over the Rhodesian situation in the face of "interference" from other countries and the UN. As a result, his internal political situation will become more complicated, particularly if he has to call for tougher measures against the rebel regime.]

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Communist China: Communist China has bought the balance of Argentina's current exportable wheat stock, some 1.5 million tons.

Conclusion of this deal winds up Peking's major wheat negotiations this year. China now has lined up nearly four million tons of wheat for 1966 delivery, an amount that probably will be supplemented by purchases from relatively high-priced secondary suppliers, such as France and Mexico. Chinese imports in 1965 will reach about six million tons.

The Chinese negotiators have pressed each of their major suppliers to offer maximum amounts for delivery this winter. Argentina has agreed to ship 200,000 tons of the recent sale this year and the remainder in early 1966. Australia, hard hit by a drought this year, was able to provide only 500,000 tons for early 1966 delivery despite Chinese insistence that it needed a larger quantity. Canberra is expected, however, to supply another 500,000 tons later in 1966.

Canada, because of commitments to other customers, has had to limit sales to China, and in 1966 will probably ship two million tons. During talks this year Ottawa signed a three-year grain deal covering up to five million tons. On Canadian initiative it was agreed that the pact could be extended to five years and 12 million tons.

Communist China: Peking's first official reaction to the UN vote on the representation issue indicates that the Chinese regard the outcome as vindication of their obdurate stand.

Peking apparently believes that China can continue to prosper internationally outside the UN. The Chinese also believe that in the long run the UN will find it increasingly difficult to function while a nuclear power with nearly a quarter of the world's population is not represented.

The editorial in People's Daily on 19 November alleges that there has been slippage in the US position on the matter, and calls the outcome a "humiliating setback" to efforts aimed at keeping Communist China from taking its "rightful place." The editorial declares that for the first time the US was unable to "rig up" a majority. This was cited as evidence that "the US, rather than China, is becoming increasingly isolated."

The editorial asserts that Peking can be refused entry for "even 10,000 years without harming China one iota." It further states that "to return to the path of its purposes and principles," the UN must expel the Chinese Nationalists, condemn "US imperialism," cancel the resolution charging China and North Korea with aggression, and undertake a "complete reform," excluding all "imperialist puppets" and removing the UN from "US domination."

The US Mission in New York notes that many European as well as Latin American delegations are talking about the need for a change of approach on the issue and will henceforth be exchanging views more or less openly. Few consider it possible to hold together a majority on the procedural tactic of an important question next year.

(continued)

The French worked closely with Peking's sponsors in the period preceding the vote, but to the mission's knowledge tried to influence voting only in the case of Laos. Although there is no indication that the issue may be brought before the credentials committee in the present session, the mission does not exclude this possibility.

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NOTES

Cyprus: President Makarios is continuing his efforts to create a surface-to-air missile defense system for Cyprus. According to the Greek Defense Minister, 133 Cypriot technicians were to leave yesterday for training in Egypt on Soviet-built SA-2 missiles. This is more than double the number previously reported to be going, but is probably enough to man only one of the three sites for which the Cypriots have support equipment.

North Korea: Pyongyang has decided to tighten party control "in all domains of the national economy" to help reverse the stagnation of heavy industrial and agricultural development which has occurred during the past three years. This decision, which includes the strengthening of the party's apparatus at the county level, was made at the Central Committee plenum held from 15 to 17 November. Despite such moves, Pyongyang probably will not be able to achieve more than a few of its top priority goals in heavy industry by 1967, when the current seven-year plan ends.

Venezuela: Student organizations have announced plans to use the observance of National Student Week (21-26 November) to air grievances against the government and to "repudiate" the visits to Venezuela of Secretary Rusk and Senator Robert Kennedy. The US Embassy in Caracas believes the Communists may use the student ceremonies to whip up sentiment for a hostile demonstration during Senator Kennedy's visit from 26 to 30 November.]

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